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Abstract 
For representative democracy to work, legislators need to be responsive to the concerns of citizens. 
One way in which this can be achieved is through constituency service. Two factors drive 
constituency service: extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. Research to date suggests that extrinsic 
motivations are crucial for constituency service. Yet, this evidence stems primarily from the US 
context characterized by a personal ballot structure and campaign content which may bias findings 
in favor of extrinsic motivations. We present evidence from the first ever field experiment 
conducted in the European Parliament (EP) in which we vary both the extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations of legislators. What is more, we are able to examine the way in which intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations interact, an aspect largely ignored in the literature. Our findings suggest that 
while intrinsic motivations matter most for constituency service in the EP, they are dampened by the 
presence of extrinsic motivations.  
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Responsiveness to voter needs and preferences is an important part of legislators’ activities (Cain, Ferejohn 
and Fiorina 1987). Yet, legislators can only represent voter preferences when they are aware of them, or put 
differently “the constituency that a representative reacts to is the constituency that he or she sees” (Fenno 
1978: 883). The notion that legislators know the preferences of their constituents underlies most classical 
theories of political representation. Surprisingly, however, recent research suggests that in today's world of 
constant information and professional polling, legislators often know only very little about voter preferences 
and what they do seem to know is often biased (Butler and Broockman 2011, Butler and Nickerson 2011, 
Broockman and Skovron 2013). Incomplete information about voter preferences has important consequences 
for political representation. A study by Butler and Nickerson (2011) suggests that providing legislators with 
more information about voter preferences makes them more likely to vote in line with constituents while 
work by Grose (2010) shows that information even increases participation rates in roll-call voting. Taking 
together this recent evidence suggests that information about constituency preferences matters a lot for 
shaping legislative behaviour.  
 This raises the question of when legislators are likely to be responsive to information from their 
constituents. The literature provides two different answers to this question (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1984, 
Searing 1985a, 1985b, see also Grose 2014). One body of work suggests that legislator responsiveness is 
primarily driven by extrinsic motivations (Fenno 1978, Mayhew 1974, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987, 
more recently see Grose 2010, Butler and Nickerson 2011, Dropp and Peskowitz 2012). Extrinsic motivation 
refers to a tendency for individuals to perform activities based on the anticipation of external rewards (Deci 
and Ryan 2000: 60). Legislators are expected to first and foremost be vote seekers and respond to voters 
when they think this will increase their changes to be re-elected. Another body of work points out that 
responsiveness of legislators may be largely driven by intrinsic motivations (Searing 1985a, 1985b, Norris 
1997, more recently see Butler and Broockman 2011, Broockman, 2013). Intrinsic motivation refers to 
behavior that is driven by an internal desire to act rather than for some separable consequence (Deci and 
Ryan 2000: 56). Applying this to legislator responsiveness, legislators are expected to be responsive based on 
an internal desire to connect to voters, a sense of duty or because they derive satisfaction from constituency 
service. The debate about which motivations drive constituency service has made a revival in recent years as 
researchers started conducting field experiments in which simple constituency service requests were sent to 
legislators via email or letters (for a discussion see Butler 2014, chapter 3 or Grose 2014). Most of this recent 
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field experimental evidence stems from the US context characterized by a highly personalised ballot and 
campaign environment, an environment that makes constituency service crucially important for securing re-
election. This case selection may bias evidence in favor of extrinsic motivations (for an overview of the work 
see Grose 2014: 364-66). 
 This study adds to the existing body of work by exploring the degree to which intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations of legislators matter for constituency service. It does so by providing evidence from the first 
ever field experiment conducted with members of the European Parliament (EP). The EP is the only directly 
elected institution in the European Union (EU) and home to over 766 legislators from 28 different countries 
that represent almost 500 million eligible voters. There are several reasons to revisit legislator responsiveness 
and the role of both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations and in the context of the EP. First, the EP provides us 
with a “laboratory setting” to examine the role of extrinsic motivations as its members are elected under a 
variety of electoral rules. The EP is a unique legislature in that each member state of the EU is allowed to 
adopt its own electoral rules and thus members of the same parliament are elected for the same time-span 
while facing starkly different electoral incentives to be responsive (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007).  
Second, our results have a bearing on the debate about the democratic deficiencies of EU politics 
(Moravcsik 2002, Føllesdal and Hix 2006). Over the past decade the EU has invested enormous efforts in 
making its institutions “more democratic and transparent” (see Treaty of Lisbon, 2009). In doing so EU 
officials aimed to combat claims that European politics suffers from a democratic deficit, which commonly 
refers to a perceived lack of accessibility of institutions to European citizens and a lack of political 
accountability (Rohrschneider 2002, Hobolt, 2012, Hobolt and Tilly 2014). Against this background, it is 
interesting to explore constituency service in the EP as well as the role of intrinsic motivations.  
Third, we currently have a very limited understanding about the way in which intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations interact. Especially social psychologists (such as Deci, 1975, Wilson, Hull and Johnson 1981) 
and increasingly behavioural economists (such as Fehr and Falk 1999, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000) 
demonstrate that extrinsic motivations “crowd out” intrinsic motivations. The presence of external rewards 
shifts the justification for an action from an internal desire to perform to an external one, something that is 
coined the overjustification effect (Leppner, Greene and Nisbett 1973). Our experiment allows for an 
examination of this effect in the context of legislator behaviour.  
Finally, the responsiveness of legislators to voters through email or other online activity deserves 
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attention in its own right. Survey evidence suggests that MEPs find it extremely important to be in contact 
with ordinary voters, 75.1 percent of MEPs claim this to be one of their most important aspects of their work, 
and 81.8 percent of MEPs consider online and email activity crucial to do so (Farrell, Hix and Scully 2010). 
Although we lack official statistics on the number of email or tweet messages MEPs receive, it seems fair to 
assume that responding to voter messages online is an important way in which members can communicate 
directly to their constituents.
2
 Evidence from the US context suggests that members of Congress indeed 
receive an enormous amount of emails and letters, 200 million in 2004 alone for example, and that they 
respond to these messages seriously by spending time and staff resources to do so (Fitch and Goldschmidt 
2005). Consequently, exploring the degree to which EP legislators are willing to respond to voter messages is 
crucial for assessing the representative links between MEPs and voters in a way that avoids possible 
problems of social desirability bias associated with surveys.  
 We conducted a field experiment in which short, simple constituency service requests were sent via 
email from voters from the 28 different member states to an MEP from their own country. The content of the 
messages were randomized in terms of the voters' concerns raised which allows us to get at the intrinsic 
motivations of legislators. Extrinsic motivations were captured by comparing response rates of MEPs from 
different member states who face re-election or not under vastly different electoral rules. Specifically, we ask 
three questions. First, do legislators respond to voter messages? Second, to what extent can intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations account for the variation in constituency service? And finally, how do intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations interact? 
 Our results indicate that compared to US legislators responsiveness within the EP is rather modest 
with roughly 28 percent of MEPs responding to voter messages while on average roughly 50 percent of US 
local, state or congress representatives respond (see for example Butler and Broockman 2011, Faller, Nathan 
and White 2014). This might not be entirely surprising given that the personalised ballot and campaign 
context in the US should trigger extrinsic motivations more than PR elections within the EU where often 
parties rather than candidates dominate the campaign. On average therefore constituency service should 
carry less weight for EU legislators compared to their US counterparts, and this is indeed what we find. 
                                                 
2 From media reports about the number of emails MEP receive in response to specific legislation they propose or reports they write, 
we know that the volume of voter email messages is large. For example, Portuguese Social Democrat MEP Edite Estrela received 
over 200.000 emails in December 2013 about her report on the sexual and reproductive rights of women 
(https://euobserver.com/justice/123001 accessed 05.02.15). 
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Second, our results indicate that intrinsic motivations seem to matter most for responsiveness. This finding is 
in line with the idea that the possible electoral returns for constituency service are lower in the EP compared 
to the US due to weaker constituency ties. Indeed, we also show that a response in our experiment did not 
make re-lection in the subsequent May 2014 EP election more or less likely. Third, our findings suggest that 
extrinsic motivations matter in that they partly crowd out intrinsic motivations to be responsive. Intrinsic 
motivations matter less when the electoral incentives to be responsive are high. These findings present 
important new insights about how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations may matter for legislator 
responsiveness, how both sets of motivations interact as well as for the popular debate about the possible 
democratic deficit in EU politics.  
We proceed as follows. First, we discuss the importance of studying legislator responsiveness and 
present our theoretical conjectures. Next, we introduce our experimental design and the ethical 
considerations involved in this study. Finally, we present our results and discuss their implications for the 
study of legislator responsiveness generally and representation in the EP specifically.  
 
The Role of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations in Constituency Service 
What drives legislators to be responsive voters? Why do legislators spend hours of valuable time to respond 
to voters’ emails or letters, listen to their complaints or reach out to them using via social media? In their 
seminal work on the topic, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1984) suggest that legislators do it largely for the 
votes. Electoral incentives play a major role in all aspects of legislator behavior, including constituency 
service (Fenno 1977, Mayhew 1974). This explanation of constituency service is challenged by authors who 
suggest that although electoral incentives might be present, constituency service is better explained by 
internal motivations of legislators, such as a sense of duty or level of inner satisfaction (Searing 1985a, 
1985b, Norris 1997). These two sets of explanations are representative of a much larger debate amongst 
psychologists and economists about which motivations drive human behavior: intrinsic and extrinsic ones 
(see Deci and Ryan 2000, Bénabou and Tirole 2003). Activity based on intrinsic motivation refers to 
behavior that is driven by internal rewards and an innate desire to fulfil psychological needs such as 
competence or a desire for relatedness. An intrinsic motivation to engage in an activity originates from inside 
the individual in order to enhance personal satisfaction or fulfilment (see White 1959, Deci and Ryan 2000). 
Legislators may wish to respond to voters based on internal norms and beliefs that this is how a legislator is 
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supposed to act or with the aim of achieving some degree of job satisfaction (Searing 1985a, 1985b, Norris 
1997). This contrasts with activities based on extrinsic motivations. These are driven by instrumental 
considerations and the prospect of external rewards or punishments. Extrinsic motivation relates to reasons 
to act in order to attain some separable outcome (Deci and Ryan 2000). Applied to legislator responsiveness, 
legislators are expected to respond to voters because it may enhance their chances of re-election would 
constitute extrinsic motivations for response (Mayhew 1974, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1984, 1987).  
 Both sets of motivations refer to two different ideas about the nature of legislative activity. A large 
body of empirical work suggests that electoral incentives are crucial for understanding legislators’ roll-call 
voting and other legislative activity (Kousser, Lewis, and Masket 2007, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987). 
Especially responding to voter queries may be one of the easiest ways for legislators to connect to voters, 
cultivate a personal vote and enhance their reputations and electoral prospects (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 
1987). In their classical study on the US and the UK, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987: 213-4) suggest that 
especially in marginal districts legislator responsiveness is primarily driven by electoral incentives. Echoing 
this conclusion, recent experimental evidence by Dropp and Peskowitz (2012) from the Texas state 
legislature suggests that electoral incentives affect legislators’ provision of legislative public goods and 
increases the number of bills legislators author.  
 Other work suggests that legislative activity might also be intrinsically motivated. Studies of 
representation have demonstrated that legislators' beliefs, role perceptions or personal backgrounds are 
important for understanding their legislative activities (see for example Searing 1985a, 1985b, Norris 
1997Miller and Stokes 1963).  Surely, intrinsic motivations are extremely difficult to capture as they refer to 
motivations that originate within the individual (see Deci and Ryan 2000, Bénabou and Tirole 2003). An 
intrinsic motivation to engage in an activity originates from inside the individual in order to enhance 
personal satisfaction or fulfilment based on feelings of duty and competence or a desire for relatedness (see 
White 1959, Deci and Ryan 2000). Recently, some authors have conceptualized intrinsic motivations as 
those relating to an expression of group norms based on theories of descriptive representation (Butler and 
Broockman 2011, Broocknman, 2013, Faller, Nathan and White 2014). The idea is that politicians act on the 
basis of internal norms and beliefs and with their activities aim to demonstrate certain group loyalties or 
compliance to certain group norms (see also Mansbridge 1999). For example, female legislators might be 
more responsive to appeals to women's interests due to a belief in gender equality. Yet, the crux in deciding 
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that motivations are intrinsic is that actors perform a task in the absence of external rewards or punishment 
(Bénabou and Tirole 2003). Recent experimental work from the US context aims to capture this contrast by 
demonstrating that non-black state legislators in the US are less likely to respond to requests of black 
constituents compared to others even when constituents are not from their own district (Broockman 2013). If 
a legislator is equally responsive to messages of voters residing within her district compared to outside, the 
behaviour of this legislator can be characterized as intrinsically motivated as only in-district voters can affect 
her re-election prospects. Yet, one could imagine that it could still well be the case that these black legislators 
are more responsive to black constituents' interests even when these constituents do not reside in their district 
due to extrinsic motivations. For example because responding more to black constituent interests could help 
secure donations of sympathetic donors or spill over to their district and help secure the ‘black vote’. Ideally, 
we would be able to vary both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations in one and the same experiment whilst at 
the same explore the interaction between the two sets of motivations. Our field experiment within the EP 
aims to do exactly that.   
 
Experimental Design and Expectations 
We conduct a field experiment to examine if and how European legislators respond to short, simple 
constituency service requests via email (see for a similar design in the US context, Butler 2014). In our 
experiment voters from the 28 different member states send an email in their respective language to a MEP 
from their country. The voters were nationals from 28 member states who were all eligible to vote in the May 
2014 EP election. Voters volunteered to participate in this experiment and received 10 pounds to compensate 
their time. The experiment was conducted on the 29
th
 of November 2013 at several universities in different 
EU member states to ensure the inclusion of voters from 28 different nationalities. All emails were sent on 
the same day within a three hour period from personal Gmail accounts at six different locations: University 
of Oxford, University of Nottingham, the European University Institute, the University of Southern Denmark 
and the University of Tartuu. All the 766 members of the 7th European Parliament (2009-2014) received one 
email message. Responsiveness is captured through whether the MEP responded within a four weeks period 
excluding the holiday season (until the 10
th
 of January 2014).
3
 Two things are important to note in this 
                                                 
3 Some readers may object that what we are capturing here is not the response of the MEP per se, but rather a response from her staff. 
We found that in a third of response cases it was indeed the MEP assistants who responded on behalf of the MEP. We believe that this 
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respect. First, when we measure whether a legislator responds, we need to also consider the quality of the 
response (see Butler 2014). This means that we do not include automatically generated responses, but only 
messages that present a content-based response to voter requests. In the case of an MEP first sending an 
automatic reply, but subsequently providing a response to the concerns raised by the voter, we count this 
second content response as a response. Second, it is important to point out that election campaigns in the 
European context are rather short compared to what one might be used to in the US. This is important as 
timing the experiment within the context of an election campaign might bias our study in favour of extrinsic 
motivations. The start of the 2014 EP election campaign was not until late March or early April as the 
leading candidates and manifestos of the key parliamentary groups were not officially ratified until the 
beginning of March 2014, a considerable time after our experiment was conducted.
4
  
 How do we operationalize extrinsic and intrinsic motivations? With respect to the former, we employ 
two measures. First, we identify those MEPs who are up for re-election in the 2014 election. Re-election is 
expected to increase extrinsic motivations for constituency service. Second, we utilize a unique feature of the 
EP, namely that its members are elected under different electoral rules (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007). Each 
of 28 EU member states decide on their own electoral rules as long as it is a form of proportional 
representation (PR). While some countries employ closed list systems where parties present lists of 
candidates and voters can only choose between parties (for example in France, Greece, Italy, Romania or the 
UK), other countries employ open list systems where voters express candidate preferences (for example in 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands or Slovenia). This distinctive feature of the EP 
allows us to study the effect of electoral incentives on constituency service. Specifically, we expect that 
open- and closed-list PR systems create different types of incentives for legislators (see Carey and Shugart 
1995, Chang 2005). While open list systems foster both inter- and intra-party competition, closed list 
systems promote mainly inter-party competition as voters have no influence on which candidate gets elected 
from the party list in these systems (Carey and Shugart 1995). As a result, open list systems are empirically 
associated with more private membership bills (Bräuniger, Brunner and Däubler 2012), personal vote (Carey 
                                                                                                                                                                  
captures legislator responsiveness nonetheless. Even if the responses come from staff, the results of our experiment still provide 
important insights into constituency service because the responses are made on behalf of the public official. What is more, elected 
officials rely on staff in many aspects of their work and if they instruct their staff to pay close attention to voter requests, it tells us 
something about their legislative priorities.  
4 For example the winner of the 2014 EP election, the European People’s Party, chose its leading candidate Jean-Claude Junker and 
adopted its electoral manifesto not until 6-7 of March during their party congress in Dublin (see http://www.epp.eu/6-7-march-epp-
hold-congress-dublin-heads-state-and-government-2000-participants-process-select-epp accessed 1/4/15). 
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and Shugart 1995) and intra-party defections (Hix 2004). Against this backdrop, we expect legislators who 
are up for re-election in in open list systems to be more responsive to voter messages compared to those 
within closed list systems as the electoral incentives to respond so are higher. Only in open list contexts can 
MEPs realistically expect to be rewarded for their constituency service as voters can express their candidate 
preferences. We also interact our two measures, open versus closed list and up for re-election or not, to 
generate variation in the intensity of extrinsic motivations that MEPs might face. 
 In order to capture intrinsic motivations for constituency service, we vary the message 
content. Specifically, the content of the messages is randomized in terms of the issues voters raised: public 
debt versus social expenditure and Europe versus national concerns. In total our experiment consisted of four 
treatment conditions: 1) a social inequality-national message, 2) a social inequality-EU message, 3) a public 
debt-national message and 4) a public debt-EU message. The text of email is presented in the box below and 
the words that are underlined reflect the different treatment conditions. 
 
Dear [Name of MEP], 
 
My name is [Name of Voter]. I am trying to decide who to vote for in the upcoming EP elections and would 
like to get some more information. I am well aware that there are many challenges that face us today, but I am 
particularly worried about the growing social inequality/ public debt in the UK/ EU. I think that the Cameron 
Government/ Barroso Commission should do something about it. For example, it should increase social 
expenditure/ tighten the budget in the coming years. I would like to know if you have taken any actions to do 
so recently or if you have plans to do so in the future. Thank you very much in advance. 
 
Best wishes, 
 
[Name of Voter]  
 
We randomly assigned each MEP to one of these different treatment groups with block 
randomization on left/right ideology. Half of either the left-wing or right-wing MEPs received a public debt 
message and the other half a social inequality message. The content of the message captures the two-
10 
 
dimensional nature of party and electoral in the EP. Competition in the EP although dominated by left/right 
considerations is two-dimensional in nature consisting of: 1) a pro/anti state intervention in the economy, and 
2) a pro/anti pooling of more national competences to the EU level dimension (Hix, Noury and Roland 
2007). Varying the voter messages in terms of social inequality and public debt captures the first dimension 
while the references to the level of government relate to the second. 
The distinctive feature of intrinsic motivations is that the actor should perform an action in absence 
of any external reward or punishment (Bénabou and Tirole 2003).
5
 Given that intrinsic motivations are based 
on internal rewards they are very difficult to capture. Here we capture intrinsic motivations for constituency 
service by exploring the bias in response rates due to message content, i.e. public debt/inequality and 
EU/national, which was randomized. If constituency service is intrinsically motivated, we expect legislators 
to display no bias due to message content. In other words, MEPs should respond equally to all voter 
constituency service requests regardless of the specific concerns being raised. If MEPs respond based on 
intrinsic motivations, they respond based on an internal reward, a sense of duty or satisfaction, so they 
should not strategically select which voter messages to respond to and which to ignore. Conversely, when 
strategic motivations drive legislators’ responsiveness to voter concerns, we would expect to find a bias in 
response rates based on the message content. As Butler (2014:12-15) suggests legislators have limited 
resources, such as time, money, staff or cognitive ability, to shape their activities and priorities. As a result, 
legislators who engage in constituency service based on the prospect of some external electoral reward, will 
“strategically concentrate their efforts in areas yielding the greatest electoral return while expending the least 
amount of effort.” (Butler 2014: 13)  That is to say, MEPs who are extrinsically motivated will strategically 
pick to be responsive to voters’ concerns that take the least possible effort.  Responding to voter messages 
that are closest to legislators’ own legislative activities and priorities about which they have the most 
information readily available will take up much less time and effort than responding to those that are further 
                                                 
5 A recent study by Broockman (2013) aims to capture this idea by manipulating the district from which the voter who sends the 
message resides. One set of messages stem from voters within the district of the legislator whilst another set is from voters residing 
outside the legislator’s district. If a legislator is equally responsive to messages of voters residing within her district compared to 
outside, the behaviour of this legislator can be characterized as intrinsically motivated as only in-district voters can affect her re-
election prospects. Within this study we could not realistically vary the district from which voter messages originate as a means to 
distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic motivations as this would almost always imply changing the language in voter messages are 
written. As such one would not be able to disentangle intrinsic motivations from differences in response due to language. Moreover, 
we maintain that responding due to intrinsic motivations does not need to be a result of being more responsive to voters with whom 
one shares a group identity. One could imagine that black legislators in the US context were more responsive to black constituents' 
interests even when these constituents do not reside in their district due to extrinsic motivations. Responding more to black 
constituent interests could help secure donations of sympathetic donors or spill over to their district and help secure the ‘black vote’.  
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removed. As a result, if extrinsic motivations guide constituency service we would expect MEPs display bias 
in their responses based on message content and respond more often to messages that coincide with their 
own policy priorities and activities.
6
 If we find no bias based on message content, this indicates that response 
to voters’ constituency service requests is most likely the result of MEPs intrinsic motivations. 
 Finally, our field experiment does not only allow us to examine how varying degrees of extrinsic as 
well as intrinsic motivations shape constituency service, but also how these two sets of motivations interact. 
Especially social psychologists (such as Deci, 1975, Wilson, Hull and Johnson 1981) but also behavioural 
economists (such as Fehr and Falk 1999, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000) demonstrate that extrinsic 
motivations “crowd out” intrinsic motivations. The presence of external rewards may shift the justification 
for an action from an internal desire to perform to an external one. This is coined the overjustification effect 
(Leppner, Greene and Nisbett 1973). Indeed, a substantial body of experimental evidence suggests that the 
presence of external rewards or punishments can sometimes be in conflict with intrinsic motivation. In what 
is now a classical social-psychological experiment Deci (1975) shows that college students who were paid to 
work on an interesting puzzle worked significantly less often than those students who did not receive a 
reward. This finding has been substantiated in many other contexts and most importantly for us also in the 
political realm. In a study on Switzerland, behavioural economists Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) surveyed 
ordinary citizens in Swiss cantons where the government was considering to locate a nuclear waste 
repository. Their findings demonstrate that the proportion of respondents who were willing to support such a 
repository in their own community was halved when a public compensation was offered. Against this 
backdrop, we expect that intrinsic motivations to respond to voters decrease as the extrinsic motivations to 
do so increase. In the context of our experiment, we would find evidence for extrinsic motivations crowding 
out intrinsic ones if the differences in response rates based on message content are greater for MEPs who 
face higher electoral incentives, who are up for re-election in open list systems, compared to those of MEPs 
facing lower electoral incentives who run in closed list systems. If this is the case, it would indicate that 
MEPs who face higher electoral incentives display more bias in their response to specific voter concerns 
compared to MEPs facing lower electoral incentives. More bias indicates that performing the act of 
                                                 
6 One objection here could be that the content of the message might prompt MEPs of opposing ideological views to be more 
responsive in order to convince the sender of an alternative viewpoint. This could also be evidence of extrinsic motivations. This 
expectation, however promising it may sound, finds little empirical support in the data. We hand-coded the content of each reply 
received to capture if the reply was either generic in nature, in line with issues raised in the email message, or aimed at trying to 
convince the sender of an alternative view. Our findings indicate that roughly 95 percent of all replies were either generic in nature or 
in line with the issues raised in the email (see Table A.1 in the Supporting Information). 
12 
 
responding is most likely not due to an internal motivation to respond, but due to the possibility of an 
external electoral reward. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
Our experiment was ethically approved by the Social Sciences & Humanities Inter-Divisional Research 
Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford (C1A13-278). In every field experiment there were many 
ethical concerns to consider in terms of the design of the study and its implications for future work. First, 
field experiments should ideally aim to avoid deception. Although some previous studies on legislator 
responsiveness use emails with fake aliases (see for example Broockman 2013, Carnes and Holbein, 2013), 
scholars have raised concerns about deliberately deceiving legislators (see Butler, Karpowitz and Pope 2012 
for example). A study by Butler and colleagues (2012) uses a research design that avoids deception in that it 
uses real voters (college students who were eligible to vote for the legislators in the study) who sent letters to 
their own legislators. We decided to follow a similar experimental set-up compared to Butler, Karpowitz and 
Pope (2012) in order to avoid deception. We designed a truthful experiment in which real voters registered 
and eligible to vote in the 2014 EP elections send emails to their MEPs. These voters participated on a 
voluntary basis using their own names. In addition, they were free to communicate further via email (or 
otherwise) with the MEP they contacted, but asked not to disclose the fact that the initial email was part of an 
experiment. By using real voters we do not have to invent aliases and mislead elected representatives. As 
Dickson (2011) suggests there is a real difference between withholding information from and actively 
deceiving subjects, our approach withholds but does not deceive. Using real actual voters that write to MEPs 
of their country about real problems they face is of course much more demanding in terms of organisation, 
yet it does not jeopardize the use of field experiments in tackling important societal issues like legislator 
responsiveness that fake emails with false aliases would. This is important, as we do not wish to aggravate 
MEPs.  
In addition, our study aims to minimize any harm to our study participants as our experimental 
database does not include any information that could identify individual MEPs or voters. In this way, we 
cannot derive any inferences about individual MEPs, yet we warrant that no individual MEP can be singled 
out and be harmed by the results of the study. The same argument holds true for political parties. Thus we 
will not refer to specific national or European parties in our results. Broockman (2013: 527) mentions the 
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importance of this approach as it also limits negative effects for future studies or funding for field 
experiments. Elected officials, he mentions, “have so not shown signs of reacting negatively to this work in 
debates over support for political science.” What is more, they have actively decided to fund it.  
Finally, we also aimed to limit the time burden placed on MEPs as much as possible. Although it is 
clearly important to examine constituency service in the EP, we as researchers have an obligation not to 
overburden legislators’ time. The emails sent in the context of our experiment were short and asked 
legislators for information about their own activities. Therefore they should be straightforward to answer if 
an MEP wished to do so.  
 
Empirical Results 
We first explore differences in response rates among EU member states based on Figure 1. Roughly 28 
percent responded to voter messages compared to more than 50 percent of U.S. representatives in similar 
studies. We do find considerable cross-national variation in response rates. Whilst in Luxembourg or 
Slovenia, roughly three-quarters of members of the EP responded, less than a quarter of Lithuanian or French 
MEPs replied. No clear regional patterns emerge from the response rates. Note that small countries have 
small delegations and thus small sample sizes; making both positive and negative outliers more likely due to 
sheer randomness. Interestingly, there is significant variation in the response rates of the bailed-out member 
states, with Ireland, Cyprus and Spain displaying relatively high response rates and Greece relatively low. 
Although it seems difficult to theoretically account for these differences across countries, the differences are 
substantial so we include country fixed effects in our analyses.  
The fact that we find an overall rather modest response rate contrasts results from past surveys that 
show that members of the EP report that they are frequently in contact with ordinary, 75.1 percent of 
members claim to be a frequent contact with ordinary voters, and 81.8 percent of members consider online 
and e-mail activity crucial to do so (Farrell, Hix and Scully 2010). Although many may well work hard and 
conscientiously for their constituents, in direct communication with voters they lag behind their US 
counterparts. 
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Figure 1: Response Rates Grouped by Country 
 
Note: The dots indicate the proportion of MEPs that replied to the email message as a percentage of all MEPs from the same country. 
 
In a second step we examine the effect of each of the two types of motivations on responsiveness of 
MEPs separately. We start with extrinsic motivations and then go on to explore intrinsic motivations. Recall 
that we capture extrinsic motivations using two types of electoral incentives: open vs closed list systems and 
standing for re-election or not. We thus use two binary variables as predictors: one denoting MEPs who stood 
for re-election in 2014 and another denoting the countries that use an open-list system.
7
 We also include their 
interaction as a way to capture any moderating effect of the electoral system on the role of re-election.  
Since neither the decision to continue one’s career as an MEP nor the electoral system in the EP 
election is randomly assigned, we need to consider potential confounding factors. First, we believe that a 
crucial source of unobserved heterogeneity stems from the degree of path dependence behind the decision to 
stand for re-election. We try to account for this by controlling for the number of previous terms served. In so 
doing we aim at capturing both fatigue, aging effects and unobserved taste for this role relative to alternative 
career paths in politics. To further control for the fact that re-election aspirations might signal differential 
level of engagement with the European Parliament, as a second control we also include a counter of the 
                                                 
7 Each of 28 EU member states decides on their own electoral rules as long as it is a form of proportional representation (PR). While 
some countries employ closed list systems where parties present lists of candidates and voters can only choose between parties (for 
example in France, Italy, Romania or the UK), other countries employ open list systems where voters express candidate preferences 
(for example in Austria, Bulgaria,, the Netherlands or Slovenia) (see the articles 20, 22 and 223 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union and the European Parliament Electoral Procedures). 
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number of different positions each MEP held during the 2009-2014 term. Third, we add a dummy that 
switches on for female MEPs. Combining all these elements, the following model is estimated: 
P(Responseij =1) =a j +b1Open- List +b2Re-election+b3(Open- List)(Re-election)
+g1Female+g2Positions+g3TermsEP+ui
 
where i indexes MEPs, j denotes countries and ȕ’s and Ȗ’s are constants to be estimated from the data. In all 
our analyses we use a Linear Probability Model with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Results 
remain substantively identical when using a binary response model for the estimation of the parameters of 
interest (results available upon request). 
 
Table 1: Explaining Constituency Service in the EP: Extrinsic Motivations and Response Rate 
 P(Response=1) 
Re-election .035 (.061) 
Open-List -.022 (.074) 
(Re-election) (Open-List) .078 (.102) 
Female .075 (.044) 
Positions in EP .011 (.015) 
Terms in EP .022 (.007) 
Effect of Re-election in Open-List Systems:  .112 (.079) 
n 766 
R-Squared .022 
Mean Squared Error .447 
Note: Entries are OLS coefficients, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-level. 
 
The results appear in Table 1 and are displayed graphically in Figure 2. We see that whereas standing 
for re-election hardly any difference in whether MEPs within closed-list systems respond, it increases the 
chances of responding by about 10% in open-list systems. Although the effect size could indicate that 
extrinsic motivations matter for responsiveness, the degree of uncertainty accompanying this estimate is very 
high. Hence, it seems safe to conclude that we do not find clear evidence that extrinsic motivations can 
account for differences in response rates amongst MEPs.  
´
b2 +b3
16 
 
 
Figure 2: Probability of Responding Conditional on Extrinsic Motivations 
 
Note: Predicted values and associated 95% confidence intervals stem from simulations (using CLARIFY, Tomz et al. 2002) based on 
Table 1, setting all control variables at their median values and gender at its modal (male) category. 
 
We now move to the role of extrinsic motivations in responding to a particular type of message. 
Recall that we theorized that if we do not find differences in response rates due to the type of message, 
response is likely due to an internal desire (intrinsic motivation) to be responsive no matter which issues a 
voter raised. In a next step we explore the average treatment effects based on different message content. 
Table 2 shows that on average we find no differences in the probability of responding based on differences in 
message content. MEPs are equally likely to respond to an EU versus national or a debt-reduction 
(henceforth Debt) versus a reducing-inequality (henceforth Inequality) message. These results lend further 
credence to the idea that constituency service in the EP is largely based on intrinsic motivations. When MEPs 
respond, they are equally likely to respond to all voters no matter the specific content of their concerns.    
 
Table 2: Explaining Constituency Service in the EP: Intrinsic Motivations and Response to Specific 
Message Content 
 Coefficients 
Debt-National message .046 (.045) 
Debt-EU .042 (.045) 
Inequality-EU message .010 (.044) 
Female .063 (.033)* 
Positions in EP .019 (.017) 
Terms in EP .015 (.007) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes 
n 702 
R-Squared .130 
Mean Squared Error .429 
Average Treatment Effects 
Debt vs Inequality .040 (.031) 
EU vs National .003 (.037) 
Note: Inequality-national message is the reference category. Entries are OLS coefficients with heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors in parentheses. * significant at p ≤ .05 level. 
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We explore the effect of message content even further as we want to be able to rule out that the lack 
of differences based on messages content may be due to the policy positions of MEPs. It could be the case 
for example that pro-redistribution MEPs respond more to Inequality messages and less to Debt messages 
and the reverse is true for MEPs who want to reduce taxes. Any evidence of this kind of differential response 
would indicate that legislators do respond strategically to their own constituents.  
In order to explore this possibility, we interact the message content with the policy stance of the 
MEP. Although we do not have full information on the attitudes of individual MEPs towards the EU or 
redistribution/taxation, we can still test this hypothesis by using information about their party stances on this 
issue. We obtain this information from the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (henceforth CHES, for more 
information see Bakker et al 2015), which provides an overall measure of EU stances, ranging from 1 (anti-
EU) to 7 (pro-EU) as well as two measures tapping into Debt/Inequality positions: taxation and 
redistribution. We will explore the results for the EU versus national messages first. We expect that the 
higher the party score is the more likely legislators are to respond to the EU message. By the same token, the 
lower this value is the more likely are MEPs to respond to the national message. We test this expectation by 
interacting this variable with a binary indicator that denotes EU messages. 
The results appear in the first column of Table 3 and are displayed graphically in Figure 3. There is 
no indication that holding more pro-EU stances increases the likelihood of responding to a European rather 
than a national message. The results again cast doubt on the role of extrinsic incentives for MEP 
responsiveness. 
 
Table 3: Explaining Constituency Service in the EP: Extrinsic Motivations and Response to Specific 
Message Content, EU-National Messages 
 EU-Position EU-Salience 
EU message .033 (.124) .030 (.224) 
EU-Position .028 (.017)  
EU Salience  .033 (.062) 
(EU Message) (EU Position) -.006 (.022)  
(EU Message) (EU Salience)  -.011 (.074) 
Female .056 (.035)* .066 (.035)* 
Positions in EP .019 (.017) .021 (.018) 
Terms in EP .015 (.007)* .015 (.008)* 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
n 702 702 
R-Squared .136 .132 
Mean Squared Error .430 .431 
Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at p ≤ .05 level. 
 
´
´
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One criticism against the analysis performed above, could be that extrinsic motivations based on EU 
versus national message content might manifest themselves not only via convergence. Rather, MEPs who are 
opposed to the EU might also feel extrinsically motivated to respond if they hold strong views on the issue. 
In more general, it could be that extrinsic incentives are driven more by the salience of the issue rather than 
the exact position of party on this issue. To test this expectation, we use two different measures. First we fold 
the original 1-7 scale so as to capture intensity of preference rather than direction (Proksch and Lo 2012). 
The new measure ranges from 0 (centrist position in the original scale) to 3, which clusters together strong 
anti- and pro-EU stances (1 and 7 respectively). Second, we also use the Chapel Hill item on EU salience, 
which ranges from 1 (very low salience) to 7 (EU highly salient). Following the previous analytical strategy, 
each of these items is interacted with the EU message binary indicator. The results from these analyses are 
shown in the second and third columns of Table 3. None of the two measures seems to confirm the idea that 
salience matters. The salience of the EU as an issue within the party of the MEP does not seem to enhance 
the chances of responding to the EU message. Combined, these two sets of results suggest that extrinsic 
motivations are less pivotal than intrinsic motivations in MEP responsiveness, at least when it comes to EU 
versus National messages.  
 
 
Figure 3: Explaining Constituency Service in the EP: Extrinsic Motivations and Probability in 
Responding to EU vs National Message 
 
Note: The solid line denotes the difference in the probability of responding to an EU versus a National message based on Table 3, 
conditional on the legislator’s position in the EU-related variable shown in the horizontal axis. The histograms present in the form of 
fractions the density of the moderating variable, i.e. EU-position, EU position-folded, and EU salience in the first, second and third 
panel respectively. The dashed curves capture the 95% CIs. 
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We now turn to the role of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations with respect to the Debt/Inequality 
messages. We follow the same logic as with the EU versus National messages in that we expect that 
convergence between the message and legislator’s views will increase the chances of responding to the 
email. The recipients of the mail were asked to comment on two problems: either balanced budget or 
inequality. We use two indicators provided in the 2010 round of CHES to capture such preferences: 
redistribution and taxation. Both indicators range from 0 to 10 and are coded so that higher values denote 
more free market opinions (pro-tax reduction and anti-redistribution stances). We interact each of these 
measures with a binary indicator switching on for those MEPs who received the Fighting-Debt message. We 
expect that as the party is more against taxation and redistribution the probability of responding to this 
message compared to the Inequality message should increase. The results appear in Table 4 and Figure 4. 
The evidence suggests that there is no change in the probability of responding to a message closer to one’s 
views. This is the case for both indicators used to measure MEPs’ policy stances. Taken as a whole, the 
results are in line with the intrinsic motivations hypothesis and provide little support for the extrinsic 
hypothesis.
8
  
 
Table 4: Explaining Constituency Service in the EP: Extrinsic Motivations and Response to Specific 
Message Content, Debt vs Inequality Message 
 Tax-Spending Redistribution 
Right message .045 (.082) .016 (.083) 
LR-Position   
Tax-Spending Position .003 (.011)  
Redistribution  .002 (.012) 
(Right Message) (Left-Right)   
(Right Message) (Tax-Spending) -.001 (.015)  
(Right Message) (Redistribution)  .004 (.016) 
Female .066 (.034)* .067 (.034)* 
Positions in EP .021 (.018) .022 (.018) 
Terms in EP .014 (.007)* .014 (.008)* 
n 702 702 
R-Squared .133 .133 
Mean Squared Error .430 .430 
Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at p ≤ .05 level. 
 
                                                 
8 In the case of the Debt/Inequality message, the logic of salience does not apply because it can generate response for either type of 
message: MEPs strongly against inequality are probably equally likely to respond to a message referring to balanced budgets as to 
inequality. The same logic holds for MEPs in favor of redistribution.    
´
´
´
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Figure 4: Explaining Constituency Service in the EP: Extrinsic Motivations and Difference in the 
Probability of Response to Debt vs Inequality Message 
 
Note: The solid line denotes the difference in the probability of responding to a debt-reduction versus an inequality message (i.e. 
fighting deficits versus combatting inequalities), conditional on the legislator’s ideological position, measured through: a) a scale on 
reducing taxes versus spending on welfare; and b) a scale measuring attitudes towards redistribution. Both scales are taken from the 
Chapel Hill expert survey and range from 0 (strongly in favor) to 10 (strongly against). The histograms present in the form of 
fractions the density of each of these variables. The dashed curves capture the 95% CIs. 
 
Finally, we turn to the last hypothesis by exploring how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations interact 
and shape constituency service in the EP parliament. In the line with the work on the overjustication effect 
(see Deci, 1975, Wilson, Hull and Johnson 1981, Fehr and Falk 1999, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000 for 
example), we expect extrinsic motivations to crowd out intrinsic ones. Specifically, when extrinsic 
motivations are absent, intrinsic ones should find more room to influence the decision of the legislator to be 
responsive. Yet, when extrinsic motivations are apparent the need for intrinsic incentives becomes less 
pivotal in determining response. We test this hypothesis by interacting our treatments with the electoral 
incentives MEPs face. Figure 5 below shows the differences in probabilities of responding to an EU versus 
National message for different electoral incentives, that is to say for MEPs who are up re-election or not 
versus those running within open versus closed list systems, and we do this for MEPs who are either pro-, 
anti- or neutral when it comes to the EU.
9
 If extrinsic motivations indeed crowd out intrinsic motivations, we 
should find that the differences in the probabilities of responding to an EU versus National message should 
be statistically significantly different for closed versus open list systems and for those MEPs who are up for 
re-election versus those who are not. 
                                                 
9 Full results are shown in the Supporting Information document, see Tables A.2 and A.3. 
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Figure 5: Difference-In-Differences between Treatment and Type of Electoral Incentives, EU vs 
National Message 
 
Note: The solid lines present the change in the probability of responding to the EU vs national message according to a) the ballot 
structure (column 1); whether MEP is up for re-election (column 2); both the ballot structure and re-election (column 3); and the 
level of national party support to the EU project. National party EU position is taken from the Chapel Hill 2010 expert survey and 
ranges from 1 (strongly against) to 7 (strongly in favor). The dashed curves enclose the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The results in Figure 5 show that we find partial evidence for the overjustification hypothesis. While 
the differences-in-differences in responding to EU versus national messages across MEPs within more pro-, 
anti-EU or EU-neutral stances are indeed significant for re-election but not for open versus closed systems, 
they are not for re-election. This indicates that MEPs are more likely to respond differently to specific voter 
concerns when they face higher electoral incentives for constituency service, but only due to the electoral 
rules they face. MEPs within open list systems are more likely to respond to voter messages in line with their 
ideological stance whilst ignoring voter messages that conflict with their stances. This indicates that extrinsic 
motivations at least partially crowd out intrinsic motivations to respond, and corroborates work from social 
psychology and behavioral economics demonstrating an overjustification effect.  
Figure 6 replicates the same analysis, using the Debt/Inequality message. The results are not equally 
supportive of the crowding-out hypothesis. MEPs less favorable to either taxation or redistribution do not 
seem to be more likely to respond to a Debt versus an Inequality message when electoral incentives are 
higher.  
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Figure 6: Difference-In-Differences between Treatment and Type of Electoral Incentives, Debt vs 
Inequality Message 
 
Note: The solid lines present the change in the probability of responding to the Debt Reduction vs Inequality message according to a) 
the ballot structure (column 1); whether MEP is up for re-election (column 2); both the ballot structure and re-election (column 3); 
and the level of national party support to redistribution (row 1) and taxation (row 2). National party positions on both issues are taken 
from the Chapel Hill 2010 expert survey and range from 0 (strongly in favor) to 10 (strongly against). The dashed curves enclose the 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
These different results for EU vs national and debt vs inequality messages could at least partially be 
explained through the fact that in the time-frame of investigation the EU integration issue was particularly 
salient and divisive within the electorate especially in the context of EP elections. Given that many 
mainstream parties in Europe are internally divided over the issue (see Van Der Wardt, De Vries and Hobolt 
2014), it might not be entirely surprising that MEPs that face higher electoral stakes might especially aim to 
respond strategically to EU vs national message. The issue of balancing budgets and fighting inequality 
represents the core of most national rather than European debates over the state of the economy, especially in 
the wake of the financial crisis, and thus might be less of a strategic concern for MEPs. To explore this 
possibility, Figure 7 shows the importance and divisiveness of the European integration and economic left-
right for voters in May 2014 shortly after our experiment was conducted. Using data from the 2014 European 
Election Study, the graph shows scatterplots with the divisiveness over European integration (x-axis) and the 
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economic left-right (y-axis) as well as the proportion of respondents in each country who think the most 
important problem is the EU (x-axis) or pensions (y-axis). Any observation above the diagonal 45-degrees 
line indicates that divisiveness over European integration exceeds divisiveness over the left-right or the 
salience EU integration exceeds the salience of pensions respectively. This is the case in the vast majority of 
countries included in the survey. Response to an EU vs national message seems thus more sensitive to 
electoral incentives compared to a message about left-right issues. Consequently, crowding out seems more 
likely in the case of voters’ EU concerns. 
 
 
Figure 7: Polarization and Salience of EU vs Economic Left-Right, 2014 EES Voter Study 
 
Note: Dots represent country averages whereas the diagonal 45-degree line is shown in blue. The first panel measures the standard 
deviation of EU and LR 0-10 scales, whereas the second panel denotes the proportion of respondents within each country who think 
of the Pensions scheme/EU as the most important issue in their country. 
 
The Importance of Intrinsic Motivations for Constituency Service in the EP 
In a last step, we delve deeper into role of intrinsic motivations for constituency service in the EP. First, we 
explore the content of the legislator responses to examine if these responses include appeals to voters to cast 
a ballot in favor of the legislator or not. If we find little evidence of legislators appealing to voters, this 
would underline the importance of intrinsic motivations for constituency service in the EP. We have coded 
the content of each legislators’ response to discern if any of the legislators make vote appeals to the sender. If 
the legislator lays out different reasons to vote for her, explicitly appeals the voter to cast a ballot for her, or 
inquires about the voting intentions of the sender, we code the response as a vote appeal (1, otherwise the 
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response is coded as 0 entailing no vote appeal). Of the 217 responses we received in total from the 766 
MEPs, only 14 included a vote appeal. In the vast majority of the responses, MEPs addressed the issues 
raised by the voter without any reference to aiming to secure their electoral support.
10
 This corroborates the 
idea that intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivations are the main drivers of constituency service in the EP.   
 Second, we explore if the MEPs who responded in our experiment are also more likely to self-report 
that they are in frequent contact with ordinary voters in a survey. In order to explore differences in self-
reported intrinsic motivations for constituency service based on responding in our experiment or not, we 
utilize the 2010 round of an MEP Survey conducted by Farrell, Hix and Scully. We can rely on only a small 
subset of MEPs for this comparison as the response rate to the survey was below 30 percent, and because the 
survey was conducted early in the parliamentary period and some MEPs were no longer in the EP by the end 
of 2013 when our experiment was conducted. We can analyze the responses of 147 MEPs in total. If we 
compare the mean response on a five-point scaled item tapping into the extent to which MEPs are in frequent 
contact with ordinary citizens (1 not very frequent, 5 very frequent) between MEPs who responded to those 
who did not, we find that those who responded are statistically significantly more likely to report that they 
put frequent effort into constituency service (mean of 3.87 compared to a mean of 3.53, p=0.026). This 
difference provides some external substantiation for our claim that a response in our experiment is largely 
driven by intrinsic motivations.   
 Finally, given that our results indicate that MEPs on average display no bias in their response to 
voter messages, we can use the response in our experiment as an instrument for re-election prospects in the 
May 2014 EP election. We constructed a new database with all MEPs who were up for re-election in 2014 
and examined if responding to voter messages affected their chances of re-election. It does not. The two 
groups of MEPs, those that responded in our experiment and those that did not, are equally likely to get re-
elected. Roughly two-thirds of MEPs in both groups were re-elected in 2014 (66 and 67 percent 
respectively). This evidence suggests that MEPs who responded to voter messages in the context of our 
experiment were no more likely to be re-elected in the subsequent EP election. Taken together, this additional 
evidence corroborates the idea that constituency service in the EP is shaped by intrinsic motivations.  
 
 
                                                 
10 For more information on the content of legislators’ responses, see Table A.4 in the Supporting Information document. 
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Discussion  
Constituency service is an important part of legislators’ activities. The reason why some legislators are more 
responsive to voters than others is therefore an important topic of debate amongst political scientists. Recent 
evidence using field experiments in the US context suggests that legislators are primarily vote-seekers and 
are responsive based on instrumental concerns relating to re-election (Grose 2010, Butler and Nickerson 
2011, Dropp and Peskowitz 2012). Yet given the personal character of the US electoral rules and campaign 
structure, this recent evidence might be biased towards extrinsic motivations. This study aims to add to the 
current debate by presenting evidence from the first ever field experiment conducted in the context of the EP. 
The institutional features of the EP and the design of our experiment allowed us to go beyond the current 
state of the art in two distinct ways. First, we were able to harvest a unique feature of the EP namely that its 
legislators are elected under starkly different electoral rules, namely open list versus closed list PR. Second, 
our experiment was able to capture the way in which intrinsic and extrinsic motivations interact, a feature 
largely unexplored in the literature on legislative behaviour thus far.  
 We report three key results. First, our findings suggest that compared to US legislators, constituency 
service of MEPs is rather modest. Given that the personalised ballot and campaign context in the US 
increases extrinsic motivations for constituency service, this finding may not be entirely surprising. Elections 
to the EP are based on various forms of PR where often parties rather than candidates dominate electoral 
campaigns. As a result, constituency service should on average be less extensive in the EU context compared 
to the US. This is indeed what our findings seem to suggest. Second, our analysis shows that intrinsic rather 
than extrinsic motivations shape constituency service in the EP. We do not find evidence that MEPs who face 
higher electoral incentives, who are up re-election in open-list systems, are more responsive than legislators 
in closed-list systems. Third, when MEPs respond, they do not display any kind of bias due to the concerns 
raised by voters. This we argue again underscores the importance of intrinsic motivations for responsiveness 
in the EP.  
The latter finding seems “good news” for the EP as while response rate overall is modest, voters can 
expect legislators to respond in an unbiased fashion to any concern they might have. Third, our findings 
suggest that extrinsic motivations do matter in that they crowd out MEPs’ intrinsic motivations to be 
responsive, especially within open list systems. This result is especially interesting in light of the fact that 
open list PR systems are increasingly popular amongst constitution makers. It argued that open list PR 
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empowers voters by giving them the opportunity to make more fine-grained choices than closed list 
systems.
11
 Yet, the results of this study showing that constituency service within open list systems displays 
more biased responsiveness partially qualifies this enthusiasm about open list PR systems.  
Our findings also inform the popular debate about the possible democratic deficiencies of EU 
institutions. Due to the fact that EU politics is often characterized by low voter interest and scant media 
attention, receiving a response from one’s MEP might carry a significant weight for perceptions about the 
parliament or decisions to participate in European elections (Rohrschneider 2002, Føllesdal and Hix 2006, 
Hobolt, 2012, Hobolt and Tilly 2014). Consequently, the overall lack of responsiveness that seems to 
characterize the EP might dampen citizen engagement. That being said, our finding that when MEPs 
respond, they are largely unbiased in terms of to which concerns they respond, might provide some relief for 
defenders of democracy in the EU.  
  
                                                 
11 For example in 2009 Indonesia changed from closed to open list PR and Iraq did the same in 2010 (Case 2015, O’Sullivan and Al-
Saiedi 2014). 
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